Resolving the Bawku Ethnic Conflict Through Dialogue and Confidence Building: Strategy Proposal
By Modesta Yuoni Addison
Introduction
Ethnicity is a state of belonging to a social group that shares a common tradition, culture, spoken language, and ancestral history (Kolstad & Wiig, 2019). Many countries in Africa are made up of different ethnic groups. Conflicts are known to take a severe toll on populations and economies. In 2016 alone, an estimated 65.6 million people were compelled to leave their homes because of conflicts around the world, while a staggering $13.6 trillion and $4.3 trillion cost was imposed on the global economy in 2015 and 2016 from these conflicts (Smith, 2018). Over the past thirty years, a significant portion of West Africa has been afflicted by internal conflicts. Some conflicts have spiraled into wars, such as those experienced in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Cote d'Ivoire. This pattern can be attributed to the unequal allocation and restricted availability of resources, economic prospects, and political influence. The potential for conflicts in Africa to turn deadly is heightened when opportunistic individuals exploit them for their own political agendas (Akudugu and Mahama, 2011). According to Jon P. Kirby, most conflicts in Northern Ghana are related to land, making effective land and conflict management strategies crucial for Ghana to achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). In addressing these conflicts, Ghana employs both indigenous strategies involving family heads, clan heads, and land priests known as “Tendaanas,” as well as exogenous strategies involving the formal police and court system. Some communities still rely on traditional methods, but there is an increasing inclination towards resorting to legal proceedings, frequently leading to outcomes where one party wins and the other loses (Akudugu and Mahama, 2011). This shift can be attributed to the erosion of traditional systems and institutions that were once dedicated to resolving conflicts. This decline has rendered the court system ineffective, as highlighted by Boniface A. Saddique, thereby contributing to the escalation of conflicts in Northern Ghana. Consequently, it becomes imperative to explore alternative approaches.
This paper delves into the enduring clash between the Kusasi and Mamprusis ethnic factions in Ghana's Bawku community. The West African country of Ghana, despite its status as something of a haven of peace nestled in a sub-region defined by unrest, has not been immune to the cost of conflict. Such conflicts took place in the Northern Region of Ghana and have raged for decades. The significance of the Bawku conflict lies in its historical roots during the colonial era and the various issues that have been exploited to ignite renewed conflicts based on ethnic differences (Adonteng-Kusi et al., 2019). According to Kendie and Akudugu (2010), the contentious issues encompass conflicting historical claims to the traditional throne, ethnic power struggles, identity-related concerns, economic disparities, and limited economic opportunities. These conflicts have often come at a great expense to the Ghanaian people whose governments have spent large sums of money to manage these conflicts. One of the most prominent and intractable conflicts in Northern Ghana is the Bawku ethnic conflict. With a population of about 119,458 (Ghana Statistical Service, 2021), Bawku serves as a trading hub and counts as one of the most significant towns in the Upper East Region of Ghana where it is situated. There are many reasons, beyond the natural need for peace, for this conflict to end and this paper focuses primarily on how to achieve this.
The Bawku Conflict Analysis
The conflict in Bawku is a complex dispute between the two largest ethnic groups: the majority Kusasis and minority Mamprusis. Several immediate causes have triggered sporadic fighting for decades, but the main sources of the dispute vary from a tussle over land ownership to conflicts over chieftaincy, as is the case in many other conflicts in Northern Ghana (Longi, 2014) These two ethnic groups have different ancestry with little in common. According to oral, traditional accounts adopted by Ghanaian historians, the origins of the Mamprusis can be traced to present-day Nigeria in the 11th century as a part of the wider Mole-Dagbani group, while the Kusasis are believed to have emigrated southwards from the historical Mali empire as far back as the 13th century (Tobias et al., 2022). Another researcher says the Mamprusis were believed to be a part of the Mole-Dagbani group. This group emigrated from present-day Nigeria in the 11th century and settled in the Mali Empire. In the 13th century, they moved from Mali to northern Ghana, subjugating the indigenous populations such as the Kussasis, Frafras, Konkombas, and Bimobas. Eventually, they established the Gbewa Kingdom at Pusiga, a few kilometers away from Bawku (Plange & Plange, 2007). In regards to chieftaincy, some scholars brand the schism between the two ethnic groups as a vestige of colonial rule and pin it down to the dissatisfaction with the interference in the enskinment of chiefs by the British Colonial government (Longi, 2014).
The colonists employed a strategy known as indirect governance in their African colonies, including Ghana. This approach involved leveraging the existing traditional political systems to manage the colonies, while simultaneously introducing the elements of the British political administration. Despite initial resistance, the colonies eventually integrated traditional African chiefs as administrators (Naseemullah & Staniland, 2014). Others still cite political maneuvering by Ghana’s first President, Kwame Nkrumah, as the trigger for the conflict. Prior to the advent of the Nkrumah government in the post-colonial era, the Nayiri, or the overlord of Mamprusi of Nalerugu, had the power to appoint Chiefs for Bawku, which was dominated by the majority Kusasi ethnic group. Wuni Bugri Saa was thus enskinned by the Nayiri as the Chief of Bawku, with the endorsement of the colonial administration. This eventuality met with intense opposition from Kusasis and began to raise tensions in the area. Some accounts hold that the Nkrumah government aligned with almost all of Kusasis for a political advantage in the 1956 elections due to their numbers. Nkrumah’s victory in the elections was thus viewed as an opportunity by Kusasis to leverage political power to have their kinsman as chief (Tobias et al., 2022). The Kusasis then took advantage of the passing of Wuni Bugri Saa to install Abugrago Azoka as Bawkunaba or Chief of Bawku contrary to existing chieftaincy succession practice, which would have seen the Nayiri make the appointment after the funeral of the late chief. This singular act resulted in the first in the series of violent confrontations between the two feuding parties in 1957 (Tobias et al).
A Commission of Inquiry set up by the government to probe the clashes upheld the claims of the Kusasis and deemed the appointment of a Mamprusi to superintend the affairs of a predominantly Kusasi community as unjust. Things took another turn when Abugrago Azoka was elevated to the status of a Paramount Chief and became the equal in rank to the Nayiri or overlord of the Mamprusis (Tobias et al., 2022). The overthrow of the Nkrumah regime in 1966 paved the way for the appointment of prominent Mamprusis to influential government positions, who used their influence to have the Chieftaincy situation reversed. Since then (Tobias et al., 2022), this response has established a precedent for political players to exploit their influence, shifting the equilibrium of power in Bawku to align with their own agenda, an approach that persists to this day.
Why peace matters in Bawku
Economic impact
A tangible relationship exists between conflict and economic development as the two arise out of the desire to meet some need or the other. Whereas economic development emanates from an effort to satisfy human or non-human need, conflict usually springs from the effort to satisfy parochial needs of various actors (Gamal A.M. Aganah, 2008). The more effort and resources go into economic development, the less there remains to be channeled into conflict and vice versa (Aganah, 2008).
Ghana is currently in the throes of arguably its worst economic crisis having defaulted on debt repayments arising out of mounting public debts, recorded low economic growth, high inflation, and an escalating cost of living crisis (World Bank, 2023). The economic situation has led to street protests by various political and civil society organizations who have demanded immediate solutions (Reuters, 2023). Conflicts are known to be expensive to manage in Ghana. As an example, the Dagbon Chieftaincy crisis, which flared up in the Northern Region of Ghana in 2002, cost the government of Ghana some seven billion cedis, roughly equivalent to $9 million in that year alone (IRIN, 2013). Nearly a decade earlier, in 1994, it cost the Ghanaian government an estimated six billion cedis to intervene in the Bawku conflict (Brukum, 2007). This harsh economic environment prevailing in Ghana does not lend itself to meeting the basic needs of the people hence the need for a speedy resolution. Beyond national spending on the conflict, the socio-economic potential of the Bawku Municipality has been devastatingly undermined by this protracted conflict and the effects have been most felt by the youth who make up a large and growing share of the population.
The price of the Bawku conflict, both human and economic, has been immense. The conflict has stalled economic activity, especially for small businesses, leading to unemployment and deepening of poverty. The limited movement of people due to security measures instituted to curtail the conflict has stunted education opportunities owing to frequent school closures and refusal of teaching and other educational staff to stay in the communities (Ampomah & Emmanuel, 2023). The impact of the conflict on the livelihoods of the people of Bawku who are mainly farmers (40%), craftsmen (23%), artisans (5%), traders (26%) and public servants (5%) has manifested mainly through food insecurity, dwindling incomes, disruption of market access and general inability to engage in economic activity (Opoku et al., 2022).
Impact on Education
Internal displacement and the need to emigrate to escape the harms of conflict is known to be a major source of disruption for education in theatres of conflict globally (UNHCR, 2014) and Bawku has not been an exception to this. The educative fallout from the Bawku conflict is reflected through the relatively low levels of formal education attainment among the populace. In a 2020 survey in the Bawku Municipality, 40% of respondents had no form of education, 35% boasted of basic and second-cycle education, 15% had technical or vocational education and only 10% had tertiary education. Pass rates in basic schools also fell from 34.2% in 2012 to 20.4% in 2016 (Lawrence Opoku et al., 2022). The Bawku conflict has also widened the gender disparity in education to the detriment of girls, as the education of boys has been prioritized due to falling household incomes (Alhassan et al, 2017). During the period from 2009 to 2011, students in communities located in the Northern Territories, specifically Bawku, experienced lower academic performance compared to other parts of the country. According to Gyan et al. (2014), the study revealed that out of the 132 students from St. Joseph JHS who took the BECE in 2010, a staggering 116 candidates, representing 87.9%, failed the exam. In contrast, a significant number of schools in the rural-urban areas of southern Ghana achieved a 100% performance rate, with a minimum performance rate of 48% in the BECE during the same period (Gyan et al., 2014).
Stakeholder evidence suggests that conflict and poverty intertwine to hinder access to basic education and its outcomes. The authors' research reveals a noteworthy decrease in average educational access and outcomes for both boys and girls. Moreover, this event suggests that the local conflict has exacerbated regional and generational inequalities between Bawku and other areas of the country. The evidence implies that these findings might partly stem from families having to choose between education and involvement in insurgent activities for boys, as well as work obligations for girls (Adonteng-Kissi, et al., 2019, pg. 68). Furthermore, Hashim (2007) observes that the Bawku area has attracted limited investment in educational infrastructure as compared to other parts of Ghana. UNESCO (2000) explains that communities that have lost educational infrastructure as an outcome of conflict are less likely to meet the goals outlined in the Dakar Framework for Action.
Loss of life and Security Implications
The significance of life loss from a security perspective is multifaceted. The vulnerability of individuals and communities to potential threats prompts the need for measures to protect and safeguard lives. Losses of life can also lead to social unrest, fear, and a breakdown of public trust, impacting security and stability. What's more, governments and organizations prioritize preventing loss of life, as it is a fundamental violation of human rights and ethical considerations. Security and development go hand in hand because the former is a public good that tends to compete with other public services such as health, education, and infrastructure, which are scarce resources. When peace prevails, more resources can then be invested in addressing more needs and enhancing the quality of life of the people (Aganah, 2006).
Ethnic and Chieftaincy conflicts in Ghana naturally result in high mortality rates
One of the most notorious conflicts in Northern Ghana, the Kokonmba-Nanumba conflict, which took place between 1994 and 1995, is said to have caused over 2,000 deaths (Tsikata & Seini, 2004). Equally disturbing, loss of life has occurred in the Bawku conflict since its inception. According to Amadu Hamza, Bawku Municipal Chief Executive, an estimated 200 people have died since the latest iteration of this conflict sprouted in late 2021. In addition to the mounting death toll and the humanitarian crisis, security experts and Ghanaian government officials harbor concerns about the potential exploitation of the conflict by terrorists operating in the Sahel Region of West Africa, who are known to be keen on pushing further south. One such expert, Adib Sani, is quoted in the African Defense Forum Magazine as describing Bawku, which is home to some 4,000 refugees fleeing Jihadist activity in neighboring Burkina Faso, as “Ghana’s weakest link in its fight against terrorism.”
The Bawku conflict has a long history of providing cover for an upsurge in criminal activity amidst the melee. In January 2008, a shooting incident occurred during the celebration of the “Samanpiid” of Fire festival in Bawku leading to the killing of 28 people (Modernghana.com, 2008). Another factor that has deepened the conflict and led to more violence is the proliferation of small arms. Ghana’s Small Arms Commission fears that the availability of these small arms, smuggled into Ghana across the porous border with Burkina Faso, has led to an escalation of the conflict (Ghanaweb, 2022). The need to maintain security and protect lives and property has naturally spawned a response from the Ghanaian Government which has deployed hundreds of troops over the years at a considerable opportunity cost. While security forces play their part in the suppression of violent conflicts, Ghana has learned from the experience in previous conflicts that the military option can only achieve so much, and that other strategies have often yielded more success.
Previous mediation efforts in the Bawku conflict, why they failed, and how to achieve permanent peace.
Since the first shots of the Bawku conflict were fired in the immediate post-independence era, many efforts have gone into attempting to resolve it. There have been intermittent lulls in hostilities, but the fundamental disagreements remain leading to sporadic outbreaks of violence. This part of the paper delves into some of the peace-building efforts, their shortcomings, and what new perspectives we can bring to permanently addressing this seemingly intractable conflict. These examples should offer scope for potential resolution of the Bawku conflict. The Bawku conflict has lingered for decades without resolution. This has however not been for want of trying. This issue is anchored by the knowledge that ethnic conflicts are difficult to manage and resolve because of the underlying identity issues, which parties hold dear and do not let go easily (Coleman, 2000). From the days of the Opoku Afari Committee formed in 1957 to investigate the first shots of this conflict through to the various government decrees and political interventions, much effort has gone into addressing the conflict. Other CSOs and religious bodies have made their attempts at achieving peace (Coleman, 2000). The matters raised earlier in this paper point to the undermining of the Bawku peace process through partisanship and self-serving initiatives.
Throughout its history, the balance of power has shifted between the parties depending on political and governmental alignments. It stands to reason that the surest way to achieve peace is to ensure trust between the feuding parties and create a feeling of belonging and confidence that their concerns and interests would be adequately catered to. Ghana has a history of effective conflict resolution in parts of the country. Other seemingly intractable ethnic-based conflagrations have been resolved in Northern Ghana through mediation efforts. Most notable among them is the successful and peaceful resolution of the Dagbon crisis earlier referenced in this paper. That Dagbon peace effort was nearly all brokered by a triumvirate of highly respected traditional rulers backed by a credible commitment by political authorities. These traditional leaders comprised the revered King of Ashanti, Otumfour Osei Tutu II, the Nayiri or overlord of the Mamprugu Traditional Area, Abdulai Mahami Sherigu and the Overlord of the Gonja Traditional Area, Sulemana Tutumba Boresa. Many years of delicate and tactful mediation eventually led to the enskinment of a new Ya Na or Overlord of Dagbon, following the murder of the previous Ya Na in 2002 that had sparked the conflict.
Another successfully resolved conflict was the Kokonmaba-Nanumba conflict of 1994-1995, widely considered the most violent in Ghana’s modern history. This eventuality was resolved through the work of a Permanent Negotiating Team comprising both governmental and non-governmental organizations (Bukari, 2013). These efforts include political interventions by national and prominent traditional leaders amidst the holding of several peace talks. Since the first shots of the Bawku conflict were fired in the immediate post-independence era, many efforts have gone into attempting to resolve it. There have been intermittent lulls in hostilities, but the fundamental disagreements remain, leading to sporadic outbreaks of violence. This part of the paper delves into some of the peace building efforts, their shortcomings and what new perspectives we can bring to permanently addressing this seemingly intractable conflict. These examples should offer scope for potential resolution of the Bawku conflict.
Lessons from past conflicts
Useful lessons need to be learned from past failure in order to design a foolproof and robust resolution mechanism for the Bawku conflict. Lessons can be found from successes chalked elsewhere as in the case of both the Dagbon and Konkomba-Nanumba conflict. Given the deep-seated mistrust prevailing among the warring factions in Bawku, any resolution mechanism must win the trust of all. Even more than that, the mediators ought to be persons of proven integrity who do not hold even the slightest interest in the conflict beyond achieving lasting peace. A mediation team along the lines of the Dagbon process or the Konkomba-Nanumba process, along with CSOs/NGOs, would be helpful. In view of the role of chieftaincy in the conflict, mediators should have sufficient knowledge about the chieftaincy and its sensitivities to better appreciate the positions of both factions.
A review of previous efforts at resolving the matter and candid admission of mistakes could serve as a useful starting point. Frank dialogue that shows sensitivity to the views of all parties will serve greatly to engender trust in the process.
Another way of obtaining the buy-in of both parties for any resolution process is to facilitate a compromise on the issue of chieftaincy and succession. Both ethnic groups can commit to alternative succession to the Bawku skin where the death of a Bawkunaba from one ethnic group will usher in the ascension to the skin of a Chief from the other ethnic group. This response is the model used in Dagbon with the chieftaincy alternating between the Abudu and Andani gates.
As a confidence-building measure, the state can take on the responsibility of restitution and compensation for persons affected by the conflict through the loss of relatives and loved ones, injury and deformity, loss of business and other forms of loss. This may entail some cost, but viewed from the perspective of lasting peace and the potential savings that can be made from not incurring additional cost to manage a conflict, it would seem a much cheaper option.
Strategies & Interventions for the Bawku Conflict
1. Strategies.
Gender-Balance: In Bawku, the local populace embraces strong traditional values, and they maintain a conservative outlook. Unfortunately, conflicts and wars often disproportionately affect women and children. Moreover, women in Bawku are excluded from participating in chieftaincy mediation and are not eligible to become chiefs themselves. The only situation where a woman is permitted to come into a decision-making room is when she is serving food to the participants. The men in the Upper East Region display greater acceptance toward women representing the government as mediators compared to women from their own local community. While I can join a government mediation team, local women from their community are not afforded the same opportunity.
The idea behind increased representation of women leading to intra-household conflict is that traditional gender roles and power dynamics within households might be challenged. However, one way to mitigate this conflict is by raising community awareness about women as leaders through street theatre. By showcasing women in leadership roles and highlighting their capabilities, stereotypes and biases can be challenged, leading to a more inclusive and accepting society. Street theatre can be an effective medium to engage and educate the community, promoting greater gender equality and reducing potential conflicts.
Beyond that, tokenism of women representation can be mitigated by providing appropriate women figures in the community who hold social and political power and belong to a range of political ideologies or parties. These should be women who are qualified, experienced, and knowledgeable in their respective fields and should be chosen based on their abilities, achievements, and skills rather than just their gender. By including women from various political ideologies and parties, we promote a more inclusive and balanced representation. This idea helps to challenge the stereotypes and provides a platform for diverse voices to be heard. When women with different perspectives and backgrounds are given positions of power, their influence can positively impact policies and decision-making processes.
Promote dialogue and mediation: Continuation and encouragement of open discussions and mediation processes to foster understanding and reconciliation between both the Kusasis and Mamprusis. Usually achieving peace involves mediation by third party intervention. Peaceful resolution often requires the involvement of a neutral mediator as a go-between. Mediation by a third party plays a crucial role in resolving conflicts, especially those involving ethnic groups. Ethnic conflicts are typically entrenched and unyielding, making it challenging for the factions to negotiate directly (Richard and Wang, 1993). However, when a trusted and impartial mediator steps in, they can facilitate compromise and negotiation. Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) often serve as effective third-party mediators, capable of not only resolving conflicts but also continuing peace-building efforts beyond the resolution stage. Utilizing local NGOs is frequently considered the best approach for achieving a successful conflict resolution, as suggested by Lipchitz and Crawford (1995).
Strengthen local governance and rule of law: Enhance legal frameworks, accountability mechanisms, and transparent processes related to Bawku chieftaincy to stop or reduce the conflict and ensure fair representation.
Promote cultural appreciation and diversity: Facilitate activities that celebrate and promote the cultural heritage and diversity of both ethnic groups, fostering mutual respect and understanding.
A transitional Co-Chieftaincy arrangement where co-chiefs from both ethnic groups can reign with their council of elders with an equal membership from both ethnic groups.
Respected religious figures or statements from the Ghana Peace Council, the National House of Chiefs, Government of Ghana, Peacebuilding NGOs (such as Voices For Peace Ghana, West Africa Center for Peace Foundation, and WANEP-GHANA) could be roped in to consolidate any such efforts. Any such process must be credible and strictly non-partisan.
2. Interventions.
Conflict resolution and peacebuilding: Facilitate peacebuilding initiatives, such as conflict resolution workshops, peace dialogues, and training in nonviolent dialogue and conflict management for both ethnic groups.
Capacity building: Provide training and support to local leaders, community members, and relevant stakeholders on conflict resolution, leadership, and effective governance practices.
Policy and legal reforms: Advocate for policy changes and legal reforms that address the root causes of the Bawku chieftaincy ethnic conflicts, ensuring equitable representation and dispute resolution mechanisms.
3. Goals.
Enhanced social coherence: Foster harmony, understanding, and cooperation between both ethnic groups in the chieftaincy conflict.
Conflict prevention and resolution: Reduce the occurrence of chieftaincy ethnic conflicts and promote peaceful resolution when conflicts arise and eventually lead to cease-fire.
Strengthened local governance: Improve the accountability, transparency, and effectiveness of chieftaincy institutions in Ghana.
4. Activities.
Conducting conflict mapping and analysis to identify underlying causes and triggers: These workshops should be approached with sensitivity, respect, and commitment to fostering dialogue and reconciliation among the stakeholders.
Facilitating community dialogues and peace forums: To engage the key community leaders, representatives from both groups, the various groups involved and clearly articulate the objectives of the peace forum. The venue and atmosphere must be neutral, welcoming, and conducive to open dialogue. Encourage active listening, respect for diverse opinions, and a non-judgmental environment. Plan the agenda, maintain neutrality, manage group dynamics, foster open communication and promote empathy.
Providing training and capacity-building workshops for stakeholders: These may include community leaders, elders, representatives from both fractions, and relevant parties. Engage expert facilitators who are specialized in conflict resolution, mediation, or related fields. they should have a deep understanding of chieftaincy conflicts, and the cultural context involved.
Advocacy for policy changes and legal reforms: The government of Ghana must implement reforms to decentralize power in chieftaincy systems. This event may include granting local communities more autonomy in selecting their chiefs. Chieftaincy and Land tenure reforms, so that chieftaincy policy changes and legal reforms will also address chieftaincy and land tenure issues. Focused on recognizing and protecting the cultural diversity in chieftaincy systems.
Supporting cultural exchange programs and inter-ethnic activities: By actively participating in cultural exchange programs and inter-ethnic activities, this response can make a positive difference in the communities. Start by exploring if there are any cultural exchange programs or inter-ethnic activities already happening in both communities. This item will give us a sense of what is already being done and help us identify potential areas for involvement or collaboration. Reach out to local organizations, community centers, or cultural associations that are involved in promoting cultural exchange. Organize events, facilitate communication, or provide logistical support. Collaborate and engage with local community leaders, religious figures, and influential individuals who can help promote and support these initiatives. Share our ideas and seek their guidance on how to best approach and engage the communities. Organize events or festivals that celebrate the diversity of both communities. Encourage participation from both fractions and different ethnic groups and invite them to showcase their traditions, music, dance, or cuisine. Such events provide opportunities for people to learn from one another and build connections.
5. Assumptions.
Assumption 1: By promoting dialogue and mediation, parties will develop a better understanding of each other's perspectives and work towards a peaceful resolution.
Assumption 2: Strengthening local governance and rule of law will reduce conflicts by ensuring fairness, transparency, and accountability in chieftaincy processes.
Assumption 3: Recognizing and appreciating cultural diversity will foster respect and reduce prejudice between different ethnic groups.
Recommendations
To ensure the desired outcomes of peacebuilding and conflict resolution in the Bawku Traditional Area, we propose the following steps. First, peacebuilders should conduct a comprehensive evaluation of their current strategies for achieving peace in the region. This assessment will enable them to revamp their approaches and devise more effective methods. The existing measures are temporary solutions that only provide short-term relief, as violence continues to resurface. Even at the time of writing, the area still experiences ongoing violence, indicating the need for a lasting resolution. Moreover, the efforts of the Ghana Peace Council, Statesmen, Religious leaders and CSOs/NGOs must adopt a more participatory, inclusive, and comprehensive approach that garners acceptance from all involved parties. To gain the trust of conflicting groups, these resolution initiatives should be characterized by openness, transparency, and frankness. Even more than that, mediation efforts should delve into the root causes of the conflict, addressing not only the issue of chieftaincy but also the underlying factors contributing to the strife. Peacebuilders must empower the conflicting parties to engage in self-negotiation, employing both needs-based and interest-based approaches. The establishment of the inter-ethnic peace committee (BIEPC) is a significant step in this direction. However, concerns raised by the Mamprusis over the BIEPC's activities need to be addressed, and the committee should strive for greater inclusivity to foster trust and cooperation.
Lastly, peacebuilding endeavors should acknowledge the presence of hidden and influential stakeholders in the conflict. For instance, involving the Nayira in future mediations is crucial due to his immense power and influence among the Mamprusis. Furthermore, politicians and political parties should be targeted, engaging them in the mediation process and persuading them to openly withdraw any support, overt or covert, for factions involved in the conflict. Involvement of youth and women groups should also be prioritized in the mediation efforts. Resolving the Bawku conflict necessitates a participatory and multifaceted approach.
References:
Adf, africa defense forum. (2023, May 4). Militants could find foothold in northern Ghana. Africa Defense Forum. https://adf-magazine.com/2023/04/militants-could-find-foothold-in-northern-ghana/
Adonteng-Kissi, O. (2019, March). Communal Conflict versus education: Experience of stakeholders in Ghana’s Bawku Conflict. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijedudev.2017.08.002
Agamah, Gamal A. M. (2006). The effects of Chieftaincy conflicts on local development: The case of the Bawku East Municipality.
Agyeman , O. (2022). Development Implications of Chieftaincy conflicts in Bawku Traditional Area, Ghana (2nd ed., Vol. 8). International Journal of Sustainable Development Research.
Alhassan. (2017). Implications of the Bawku Chieftaincy Conflict on Basic Education in the Bawku Traditional Area of the Upper East Region of Ghana (2nd ed., Vol. 3). UDS International Journal of Development, .
Amount of small and light weapons in use in bawku conflict worrying – NACSA executive secretary. GhanaWeb. (2022, September 22). https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/Amount-of-small-and-light-weapons-in-use-in-Bawku-conflict-worrying-NACSA-Executive-Secretary-1628399
Ampomah, E. (2023, March 31). Assessing the impact of the Bawku Conflict on Youth Livelihoods. HSRC. https://hsrc.ac.za/news/economic-development/assessing-the-impact-of-the-bawku-conflict-on-youth-livelihoods/
Brukum. (2007). Chieftaincy and Ethnic conflicts in the Northern Region of Ghana. Woeli Publishing Services.
C.Gyan, M. B. M. G. M. (2014). Push Out or Drop Out? Taking a critical look at the poor performance and drop-out of students of the JSS/JHS Programme in Ghana.
Counting the cost of the Dagbon Crisis. GhanaWeb. (2013a, October 19). https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/Counting-the-Cost-of-the-Dagbon-Crisis-33885
Felix, L. Y. T. (2014). The Kusasi-Mamprusis conflict in Bawku: A legacy of British colonial policy in Northern Ghana” Ghana studies (Vol. 17).
Ghana Statistical Service. (2021). 2021 Population and Housing Census. Ministry of Finance. http://census2021.statsghana.gov.gh/
I. Hashim. (2007). Independent child migration and education in Ghana.
Lipchitz, R., & Crawford, B. (1995). Ethnic Conflict resolution.
M. Akudugu, S. K. (2010). Application of game theory in the management of Qnatural resources conflicts: the case of the Bongo District’ .
Mamudu A. Akudugu , E. S. M. (2011). Promoting Community-Based Conflict Management and Resolution Mechanisms in the Bawku Traditional Area of Ghana, 43, 80–103.
Naseemullah, A., & Staniland, P. (2014, November 24). Indirect Rule and Varieties of Governance . https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/gove.12129
Noagah, B. K. (2013). conflicts & communications online (Vol. 12). www.cco.regener-online.de ISSN 1618-0747.
Over 500 soldiers to be deployed to bawku. Citinewsroom. (2023, May 5). https://citinewsroom.com/2023/05/over-500-soldiers-to-be-deployed-to-bawku/
P. T, C. (2000). The handbook of conflict resolution: Theory and practice (Ser. Theory and practice. San Francisco). Intractable conflicts. In: M. Deutch & P.T. Coleman (Eds.), .
Seini, T. (2004). Identities, inequalities and conflict in Ghana . RISE Working paper series 5.
Smith, R. (2018, January). Conflict costs the global economy $ 14 trillion a year. http://www.weforum.org/agenda/2018/01/conflict-costs-global-economy-14-trillion-a-year/
Statesman, T. (2008, January 29). Bawku conflict suspects remanded. Modern Ghana. https://www.modernghana.com/news/155852/bawku-conflict-suspects-remanded.html
Tobias. (2022). Elite Mobilisation and ethnic conflicts: evidence from Bawku Traditional Area.
UNESCO. (2017, January 2). The Dakar Framework for Action. Education for All: Meeting Our Collective Commitments, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0012/001211/121147e.pdf
UNHCR Global Trends. (2015, June 18). UNHCR Global Trends: Forced displacement in 2014 - world. ReliefWeb. https://reliefweb.int/report/world/unhcr-global-trends-forced-displacement-2014
World Bank. (2023, July 19). Ghana’s Economy Expected to Recover its Potential By 2025. https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2023/07/19/ghana-economy-
